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1 The Horn of Africa has suffered almost continuous and intricate conflict over the last two
or  three  decades.  The  complexities  almost  allow  the  use  of  the  word  «anarchic»,
particularly in reference to the collapsed state of Somalia. Certainly, some elements in
the confusion may be identified: colonial or post-colonial, ethnic, strategic or ideological
factors have a role to play, but none provide the basis for a clear, coherent analysis of the
conflicts of the Horn.
2 Eritrea in its present boundaries was a construct of Italian colonialism, and the struggle
against  Ethiopia  from 1961  was  predicated  on  the  basis  of  an  anti-colonial  struggle
though this is rather more debatable than the liberation fronts, particularly the Eritrean
People’s  Liberation  Front,  have  claimed.  It  depends,  too,  upon  a  controversial  re-
interpretation of Ethiopian history. Eritrea's recent war with Ethiopia (1998-2000) can be
seen as a struggle for status within the former Ethiopian polity, an attempt to seize the
regional  hegemonic  position  previously  enjoyed  by  Mengistu  Haile  Mariam or  Haile
Selassie.  The  struggle  of  the  Oromo  Liberation  front  (OLF)  within  Ethiopia  largely
interprets itself as an anti-colonial conflict though this again involves a re-interpretation
of both Ethiopian history and the definition of colonialism. Geo-political interests are
present, but only partially. There is some strategic interest in the Red Sea coastline of
Eritrea;  involvement,  or possible involvement,  in terrorism in Somalia has become of
interest to the United States since September 11 2001. It is, however, a region of few if any
natural  resources,  though  there  may  be  potential.  The  countries  involved,  Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Somaliland and Somalia are some of the poorest in the world, right at the bottom
of  the  UN's  world  statistical  league  tables.  There  is  massive  need  for  international
assistance,  but  as  yet  little  direct  exploitation  of  resources,  externally  or  internally.
Neither is likely for the foreseeable future.
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3 A decade ago,  there were hopes that  the collapse of  the bloody and violent military
dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia, and of the similarly despotic rule of
Siad Barre in Somalia,  both in the same year 1991,  would provide for a real  change.
Somalia, however, proved intractable from the start, partly because the collapse of the
state proceeded the actual fall  of Siad Barre by several years.  There was the marked
failure of the international community, in particular the US and the UN between 1992 and
1995, to understand the convoluted clan politics of Somalia. Nor have the aspirations of
the people of northern Somalia who declared their own independence in 1991 yet been
recognised. By contrast, the international community accepted Eritrea's independence,
backed by Ethiopia's enforced and in some ways reluctant acquiescence. The two states
acquired  new  leaders,  Issayas  Aferworki  and  Meles  Zenawi,  who  were  feted  by  US
President Clinton as renaissance princes of a new Africa.
4 It was a view that had little basis in reality; and it couldn't last. In May 1998, Eritrea
invaded Ethiopia, but was forced to make peace after military defeats in May and June
2000. The short but very violent conflict left 60,000-70,000 thousand dead and tens of
thousands more wounded.
5 Although  the  conflict  ostensibly  ended  in  December  2000  the  two  countries  have
continued to indulge in overt propaganda against the other, and support each other's
dissidents in deliberate efforts to destabilise the other. Eritrea's foreign policy currently
appears to be based on the premise that its recent defeat must to be reversed through the
destabilisation, even the collapse, of Ethiopia. Ethiopia seems to believe that no peaceful
solution  to  the  problems  with  Eritrea  is  possible  while  Issayas  Aferworki  remains
president of Eritrea.
6 State formation, and state conflict, has a long history in the Horn of Africa, going back to
the first organised polity around Axum, some two thousand years ago, which included the
areas  of  northern Ethiopia  and southern Eritrea  currently  inhabited by the Tigrinya
speaking people.
7 Subsequent centres of state power appeared further south among various peoples, Agau,
Amhara, Oromo, Sidama and Somali. At the beginning of the 16th century there were two
main poles  of  imperial  and state  power.  One was  a  Christian empire  centred in  the
regions of Shoa and Wollo and incorporating Amhara, Tigreans and Agau peoples. The
other was the Muslim Sultanate of Adal based on the Harla and other pre-Somali peoples
of eastern areas as well as various Somali clans. There were also a number of the Sidama
states caught between, and making up much of the battleground. These representatives
of opposing Christian and Islamic world views fought each other to a standstill in the
mid-16th century, despite allying respectively with the superpowers of the day, Portugal
and  the  Ottoman Empire,  providing  striking  parallels  with  the  relationship  between
Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1970s and 1980s.
8 Their  mutual  exhaustion  in  the  mid-16th  century  allowed  a  new  power  to  emerge,
erupting out  of  the south.  The Oromo,  co-incidentally animist,  within a  century had
expanded to conquer significant areas of both Adal and the first Shoan Empire, and the
Sidama states. Adal was fatally weakened and only survived in the city state of Harar and
the remote Sultanate of Assieta in the Danakil desert; the Christian empire, abandoning
huge areas to the Oromo, retreated to a new centre in the north west, Gondar. There, over
the next two centuries, power fluctuated between different regions and peoples. Under a
series of powerless emperors in the late 18th century local rulers created a number of
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virtually autonomous kingdoms, largely ethnically based, Tigrean in the later Ethiopian
provinces of Tigrai and Eritrea, Oromos in Wollo, and Gondar, Agau in Wag and Lasta,
Amharas in Shoa, Gojjam and Begemeder. The Oromo expansion ran out of steam in the
18th century leaving a number of Sidama states, including Kaffa, Enaryea and Wollamo,
still  independent.  Subsequently  a  number of  Oromo kingdoms emerged,  in  Wollo,  in
Wollega and in the southwest Gibe area, with, in many cases, Oromo princes ruling over
substantial conquered populations.
9 The conflicts between these various political centres,  whether in the 16th century or
later,  can  certainly  be  seen  in  terms  of  religion  or,  as  recently  most  emphasised,
ethnicity.  They  also  fit  plausibly  within  a  paradigm  of  constant  oscillation  between
expanding and contracting states, between conquests and the subsequent fragmentation
of  the  friable  imperial  pretensions  of  Shoa,  Adal,  Gondar  and  other  pretenders.
Ultimately, it proved to be the kingdom of Shoa, ethnically an Amhara-Oromo polity,
which proved able to build up the 20th century Ethiopian empire state, by a mixture of
conquest and diplomacy, including a series of alliances with the colonial powers, Britain,
France and Italy. The empire only reached its greatest extent in 1962, when Eritrea was
formally re-incorporated, still carrying the long out-dated, indeed medieval, baggage of
the myth of Solomon and Sheba, and substantial feudal overtones particularly in highland
Tigrean and Amhara areas. It was only under Haile Selassie that a centralised autocracy
was  finally  achieved,  imposed  during  the  1940s  and  1950s,  but  this  rapidly  led  to
significant reactions from former polities, whether semi-feudal baronies or previously
independent  peripheral  states  and  peoples.  The  empire,  over-extended  by  the  re-
incorporation of Eritrea, only survived its triumph by 12 years. In1974, Haile Selassie was
overthrown,  to be replaced by a military dictatorship,  which attempted to provide a
socialist framework to replace the imperial skeleton. Unsurprisingly, given the military
regime's close links with the Soviet Union, there was little change in the priority given to
centralised control.
10 The core problem of the Ethiopian polity in the last 40 years has been effort to find an
acceptable pattern of government. The most recent version has been the attempt of the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since it took power in 1991 to
create ethnic federalism. It has built upon the concept of ethnicity, of regionally based
autonomous  states,  first  articulated  under  Mengistu  but  refined  significantly  by  the
Tigrai Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the main element within the EPRDF, on the basis
of its guerrilla struggle in Tigrai region which started in 1975. The TPLF called upon a
concept  of  Tigrean  solidarity,  not  altogether  convincingly  articulated  as  Tigrean
nationalism, based upon a common history of oppression and a shared myth of the past.
The local ideological basis was originally supplemented by the TPLF's commitment to
international socialism, with a leaning towards Albania as a model, aiming to provide for
a wider appeal within a socialist Ethiopia suffering under Mengistu's version of a pro-
Soviet ideological state. This idea was dropped at the end of the 1980s when it became
apparent it would not be acceptable either to Ethiopians or the international community
and more specifically  the United States.  The TPLF,  one of  the smaller  ethnic  groups
within the Ethiopian state, were left with no alternative ideological basis than ethnically
based federalism designed to appeal to the growth in anti-government movements which
had proliferated in the 1980s among Oromos, Somalis, Afars and others. It has not yet
managed, however, to produce sufficient devolution or democratic structures to satisfy
the aspirations of the major ethnic groups in the state. One result has been continued
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low-level  ethnic conflict  in peripheral  areas,  in some cases financed and armed,  and
certainly encouraged, by Eritrea.
11 The difficulties inherent in organising federalism on an ethnic basis are obvious, and the
example of Yugoslavia in recent years has underlined the dangers. This was certainly one
of the factors that encouraged the Eritrean government to go to war with Ethiopia in
1998. Issayas Aferwerki apparently believed that Ethiopia would fall apart into separate
states  despite  the  significant  levels  of  control  the  TPLF/EPRPDF  has  consistently
maintained  within  the  federal  structure.  In  Eritrea,  the  ruling  Eritrean  People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF),  now the Peoples Front for  Democracy and Justice (PFDJ),  by
contrast insisted on the necessity of a single central authority, at the expense of both
regionalism and ethnicity  (Eritrea  has  nine  ethnic  groups)  to  emphasise  an  Eritrean
identity. This had to be coupled with extensive re-writing of Eritrean history, and the
need for an aggressive foreign policy in support of a nationalism forged in the struggle
against Ethiopia but without real roots in Eritrean history.
12 The  EPLF/PFDJ,  which  won  the  war  against  Ethiopia,  was  largely  based  among  the
Christian  highland Tigrinya-speaking  agricultural  population  of  the  Kebessa,  an  area
historically part of almost all the Amhara/Tigrean states in the region from about 500 BC
onwards. The exception was the brief Italian colonial period, 1880s to 1940s. The original
impetus for Eritrean nationalism came from the peripheral areas to the north and west,
from the  Muslim lowland non-Tigrinya  speaking,  pastoral  peoples.  Originally,  it  was
ideologically closer to religious separatism than anti-colonialism, and was exemplified by
the original guerrilla movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which was expelled
from Eritrea by the EPLF in a civil war in 1981-82. This left the EPLF and Issayas Aferwerki
in  the  position  of  presiding  over  an  independent  Eritrea, a  concept  whose  greatest
supporters,  historically,  were drawn from the groups the EPLF expelled in the 1980s.
Conversely, the main support of the present government of Eritrea comes from groups
linked by  ethnicity  and history  to  the  Ethiopian  state  to  the  south  that  historically
incorporated all the Tigrinya speaking populations.
13 This  need  to  emphasise  Eritrean  identity  provides  one  explanation  for  the  almost
continual  conflict  in which Eritrea has been enmeshed since formal independence in
1993. There has been war with Yemen, problems over the border with Djibouti, and with
Sudan, and war again with Ethiopia 1998-2000. Recent internal political problems, and the
continuous  failure  to  make  any  serious  attempt  to  incorporate  the  Muslim  lowland
groups largely represented by ELF factions, suggests the government will find a need for
further conflict.  The hegemonic pretensions of Eritrea,  or rather of  president Issayas
Aferwerki in the Horn and the lower Red Sea reinforce the possibility. Additionally, there
are a number of unresolved issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea, including the border
despite the near Solomonaic wisdom displayed by Boundary Commission in its recent
report. It managed to produce a result allowing both sides to claim victory, but neither
got  all  they  hoped  or  expected,  and  the  original  flash-point  of  Badme  was  left,
deliberately, undefined when the commission reported in March. This will await aerial
photographs and the actual  delimitation of  the border.  Whatever the final  result,  all
indications are that tensions will continue.
14 The other main area of conflict in recent years in the Horn has, of course, been Somalia,
one of the clearest examples of a «collapsed» or «failed» state, which has added an extra
dimension to the decade or so of conflict from which it has suffered. The failure of the
Somali state is usually ascribed to the regime of Siad Barre, but it has a rather longer
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genesis,  arising  from  its  divergent  colonial  past,  and  the  myths  that  attended  its
foundation. One major delusion was that Somalia was the only state in Africa that was
ethnically homogenous. This was inaccurate on two levels.
15 There were minority non-Somali clans in the river valleys, often referred to disparagingly
as jeerer (hard hair), or as Gosha, who originate further south and who were, originally at
least, Swahili speakers. Secondly, Somalis constitute six clan families, Darod, Digil, Dir,
Hawiye,  Isaaq,  and  Merifle,  each  made  up  of  a  multiplicity  of  clans  and  sub-clans,
including both pastoralists and non-pastoralists. In a practical sense, these clans normally
co-operate only in response to an outside threat. Any unity of purpose, historically, has
been artificial and impermanent. Somalia, in fact, is a classic case of the imposed colonial
state,  unlike Ethiopia where state formation in various forms had a long history.  All
Somalia  can offer,  with the exception of  the partial  Somali  involvement  in the Adal
Sultanate of the 16th century, are a few clan specific sultanates such as the Ajuran in the
17th century and the Majerteen in the 19th century. Territoriality had little relevance to
the  pastoral  clans  though  control  of  wells  was  always  important.  One  effect  of  the
creation of a state was that the concept of territory greatly expanded, and control of land
became a major issue with the appearance of plantations along the river valleys of the
Shebelli and the Juba.
16 The  state  created  in  1960  was  also  composed  of  two  separate  fragments,  British
Somaliland in the north and Italian Somaliland in the south. The difference that this
dissimilar colonial background implies was subsequently important as was the fact that
they actually became independent individually, if only five days apart. British Somaliland
achieved  independence  first  and  then  voluntarily  joined  the  south  when  it  became
independent a few days later by an act of union that was not, in fact, ever ratified. The
internal  contradictions  that  followed  this  unification  provided  one  reason  why  the
original focus of violence on the new state revolved around a national building effort to
incorporate Somali minorities in other states, in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. The Somali
flag, with its five-pointed star, each point representing a Somali population, symbolised
the intention of expanding the alleged homogeneity of the state to encompass all Somalis
in a single ethnic nation state.
17 The failure of these efforts, in Djibouti, in Ethiopia and in Kenya, was, in turn, one of the
factors that led to the demise of the parliamentary state in 1969. By then, the dependence
upon «clanism» was such that  in the 1969 election nearly  seventy different  political
parties were standing,  all  clan specific.  Later that year,  Siad Barre acted precisely to
remove this political  chaos.  His solution was a military and socialist  dictatorship.  He
again went to war with Ethiopia,  taking advantage of  the confusion of  the Ethiopian
revolution to try and incorporate Ethiopian Somalis into Somalia. The victory of Ethiopia,
aided by Russia and Cuba, coupled with his own arrogance of power, rapidly led Siad
Barre back to the dependency upon the clan which he had claimed to repudiate when he
came to power. In succession he turned on the Majerteen, the Isaaq, the Ogaden and the
Hawiye, using other clan militias, in particular those of his own Marehan clan. Before he
finally fled Mogadishu in January 1991, all the main clans had created their own militias
as well as political organisations (parties is too coherent a word). Subsequently, a series of
«warlords» appeared to lead these militias,  usually ex-colonels  in Siad Barre's  army.
«Warlords» is not, perhaps, a strictly accurate term, though it is convenient shorthand, as
in Somali terms «warlords» are, in the last resort, clan dependant. Often their «technicals
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», the equivalent of tanks in the Somali context, are usually supplied by the clan, though
some have their own private vehicles as do some businessmen and the Islamic courts.
18 The militarisation of conflict in Somalia has continued virtually unabated since the last
years  of  Siad  Barre.  There  was  a  brief  hiatus  during  the  early  stages  of  direct  UN
involvement in 1992 to 1995 but this rapidly ended with the US failure to attempt any
disarmament of the militias, and the US attempts to kill General Mohamed Farah «Aydeed
»,  one of the leading «warlords».  The UN has made other efforts to involve itself  in
peacemaking from 1991 on, but with equally little success. The main reason has been the
UN's stubborn insistence on attempting to restore the single Somali state as it was, using
a series of international reconciliation conferences attended by as many «warlords» as
possible. These have merely provided for a distribution of the theoretical political posts,
with various agreements, never intended to be implemented, broken immediately. It is no
coincidence that the most substantial area of conflict has been, and remains, Mogadishu,
the main resource centre for Somalia, and the place through which international agencies
and the UN operated. When the UN left Mogadishu in 1995 there were reported to be 120
dollar millionaires residing in the port area alone. The other main areas of conflict have
tended to be the ports through which resources can be expected to arrive,  Kismayo,
Bosasso, Merca and Brava.
19 There has been a second and conflicting strategy for the renewal of Somalia, one that
recognised the political and economic diversity of Somali clan and regional interests. This
was the so-called «building-block» approach, allowing the different clans to set up their
own administrative units with the reasonable expectation that they might subsequently
come together again at a later stage. For a time this did make considerable progress, with
Puntland in the northeast based on the Majerteen clan; an administration in Bay and
Bakool for the Merifle; and the Hawadle in Hiran.
20 Attempts in Benadir region and Mogadishu among the Hawiye were less successful but a
start was made. The exemplar was Somaliland, the former British colony, which declared
its own independence from the rest of Somalia as the Republic of Somaliland in 1991. It
has created a viable state, with a functioning government, judiciary and police force, and
has managed its own affairs with considerable success since then despite the deliberate
failure  of  the  international  community  to  grant  recognition.  In  fact,  despite  the
consistent  efforts  of  the UN to undermine its  existence,  Somaliland has  been widely
accepted though not recognised. No one will take the first step even though its example
has pointed a clear way forward for the rest of Somalia to achieve the loose federal or
confederal structure that would appear to be designed for clan politics. The United Arab
Emirates has been mentioned as a model.
21 Although  the  «building-block» model  was  making  significant  progress  after  1998  in
southern Somalia,  the  UN,  quite  inexplicably,  reverted  to  its  previous  approach and
recognised the Transitional National Government (TNG) created at the Arta conference in
Djibouti in 2000. This was highly controversial because of the involvement of significant
elements from Siad Barre's regime. It also returned to the discredited «top-down»
process of organising conferences. The TNG subsequently failed to make much impact on
Somali despite having UN recognition and some Arab League support. Its presence also
led directly to the creation of  an opposing Somali  Reconciliation and Reconstruction
Council (SRRC) set up under Ethiopian auspices. Its members control well over half of
southern Somalia.  Another reconciliation conference is  planned for Nairobi  later this
year, the fifteenth. It is unlikely to make much progress if indeed it actually takes place.
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The SRRC threatens not to attend if the TNG tries to come as a government and to use the
conference to try and increase its credibility. The TNG, which still controls no more than
a part of  Mogadishu,  though it  has allies in other areas,  insists it  will  be going as a
government. Somaliland had made it clear it will not attend in any capacity even that of
observer.
22 Somalia, in fact, moved up the international agenda again after September 11 2001 and
the declaration of the US war on terrorism. The reasons, were, and remain, some what
vague and ill-defined, but central to US interest was the general point that Somalia as a
collapsed state was open to manipulation by external bodies like Al-Quaeda or similar
organisations.  More  particularly,  the  Somali  organisation,  Al  Itahaad  al-Islamia  was
classified as a «fundamentalist» organisation, close to NIF in Sudan and with links to Al-
Quaeda, despite considerable doubts over its current coherence as an organisation. The
origins of the suspicions about al-Itahaad lie in its admitted involvement in bomb attacks
in  Ethiopia  in  1994/95,  cross-border  military  attacks,  and  its  links  with  an  anti-
government Somali movement, the Ogaden National Liberation front (ONLF), operating in
the  Somali  state  in  eastern  Ethiopia.  There  were  apparently  suspicions  that  those
involved in the attack on the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 may have passed through
Somalia under the auspices of al-ltahaad, en route to Kenya. The remittance company, Al-
Barakaad  was  accused  of  money  laundering  for  AI-Quaeda.  In  neither  case  was  any
concrete evidence produced though Al-Barakaad was effectively closed down with major
effects on the internal economy of Somalia. Irrespective of the validity of the accusations,
Al-Barakaad was the largest company for small-scale regular personal remittances on
which many people in Somalia depend in the absence of any formal economy.
23 Other concerns have been raised particularly by Ethiopia over the links of the TNG. At
one level this has involved the TNG's controversial origins, its relations with Libya and
the Arab League,  and the support  it  had from the Islamic Courts  in Mogadishu.  The
Ethiopian  backed  SRRC has  also  provided very  detailed  allegations  against  the  TNG,
claiming close links with Al-Itahaad and even Al-Quaeda. In fact, however, the US has
behaved with surprising caution, continuing its «information collecting mode», with a
series of military, CIA and embassy officials from Nairobi investigating on the ground and
visiting various areas. It appears that while large scale attacks or bombing may have been
ruled out, selective strikes have not. Equally, the US has turned a blind eye to Ethiopia
operations inside Somalia backing its allies against supporters of the TNG. Overall, all
Somali political factions have been trying hard to demonstrate to the US their support for
anti-terrorism.
24 Factionalism in Somalia has allowed external powers to become involved and they have
seized their opportunity, rendering any solution to the crisis of the Somali state all the
more difficult. Ethiopia and Eritrea involved themselves in conflict by proxy in Somalia
during 1999-2000, and are still doing so with Eritrea provocatively recognising the TNG
earlier this year, and supplying it with arms. The Ethio-Eritrean conflict formally came to
an end in December 2000 with a peace agreement, but neither side have stopped their
propaganda, often vitriolic, or their support for each other's dissidents. Most recently,
Eritrea  organised  the  infiltration  of  Oromo  Liberation  Front  fighters  into  western
Ethiopia  and  has  been  backing  the  Ethiopian  People’s  Patriotic  Front  in  northwest
Ethiopia.  Egypt has consistently been using Somalia as an element in its  attempts to
influence Ethiopian policies over the Nile. Its main interest is to have a stronger Somalia
to balance the power of Ethiopia; its concern remains the issue of the Nile water, despite
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some progress by the riparian states towards negotiating more equitable agreements.
Egypt has therefore backed the TNG, which has been funded by both Libya and Saudi
Arabia. There has been a consensus recently that IGAD, Inter Governmental Agency for
Development,  as  a  regional  body,  should  take  responsibility  for  Somalia,  but  IGAD
includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan; its members are bitterly divided
over Somalia. Not surprisingly, it has been essentially ineffectual.
25 The conflicts of the last decade in Somalia, as much as those elsewhere in the Horn of
Africa continue to raise issues of the relationship of ethnicity with the state, of state
formation, and even questions of the desirability or necessity of a single Somali state. One
factor stands out in Somalia: the people most capable of answering any such questions are
Somalis themselves as they demonstrated in Somaliland where national conferences in
Boroma  and  Burao  produced  new  democratic  and  secular  structures  and  acceptable
solutions to the problems of government for one part of the former Somali state. It is, in
fact, difficult to see wider solutions to Somalia's political crisis in the absence of a total
ban on external intervention. State formation in the Horn of Africa remains an on-going
process: Somaliland, if still unrecognised, appeared in 1991, Eritrea in 1993.
26 Neighbouring Sudan is riven by a conflict between north and south which has raised
doubts about the continued viability of a single Sudanese state. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea
have yet failed to solve questions raised by ethnic minorities, several of which have taken
up arms in their  struggle for self-determination or autonomy,  including Oromos and
Somalis in Ethiopia, Afars in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Kunama, and Beni Arnir in
Eritrea.  Until  feasible  solutions  can  be  found  and  accept  able  forms  of  government
implemented,  with  sustainable  capacity  building  and real  democratic  structures,  the
possibilities of conflict will remain high.
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ABSTRACTS
Somalia  was  an  artificial  colonial  construct  and  had  no  depth  of  state  formation.  Although
supposedly homogenous, its clan families operate as independent entities and the reality of any
Somali commitment to a single state must be questioned. Under the stresses of military defeat
against Ethiopia, and a failed socialist revolution, and the resurrection of «clanism», it fell apart
in the late 1980s. Subsequent international efforts to rebuild the state of Somalia have failed
because the international community has ignored the realities of Somalia clan politics. The only
area to succeed in restoring political structures is Somaliland, basing itself upon one particular
clan  family;  its  attempts  have  rejected  internationally,  despite  having  provided  a  clear,  and
successful, model for the rest of Somalia.
A Somália foi uma construção colonial artificial e não conheceu e formação de um Estado sólido e
enraizado.  A pesar da sua suposta homogeneidade,  as suas famílias clânicas funcionam como
entidades independentes umas das outras, e parece duvidoso que haja na Somália uma adesão a
ideia de um Estado Único e abrangente. A derrota militar frente à Etiópia, o fracasso da revolução
socialista, e a ressurreição do «clanismo» provocaram o colapso deste Estado no fim dos anos 80.
Posteriores  esforços  internacionais  para  o  reconstruir  falharam  porque  a  comunidade
internacional ignorou as realidades da lógica política dos clãs. A única região onde se conseguiu
restaurar  estruturas políticas  estatais  e  a  da  Somalilândia  onde  tem  como  suporte  uma
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determinada família clânica. Ora, estas tentativas tem sido rejeitadas a nível internacional, muito
embora constituam um modelo claro e bem sucedido para a restante Somália.
La Somalie a été une construction coloniale artificielle et n'a pas connu la formation d'un Etat
solide et enracine. Malgré l'homogénéité qu'un leur attribue, ses familles claniques fonctionnent
comme des unités indépendantes unes des autres,  et  il  paraît  douteux qu'il  y  ait  en Somalie
l'acceptation de l'idée d'un Etat unique pour tout le territoire. L'échec militaire face à l'Ethiopie,
le débâcle de la révolution socialiste et la renaissance du « clanisme » a provoqué l'éclatement de
cet  Etat  à  la  fin  des  années  80.  Les  efforts  internationaux  entrepris  par  la  suite  pour  le
reconstruire n'ont pas eu de succès parce que la communauté internationale a ignoré la logique
politique des clans. La seule région ou l'on a réussi a restaurer des structures politiques d'Etat est
cella de la Somaliland ou elles reposent sur une famille clanique donnée. Or, ces tentatives ont
été rejetées au plan international, malgré le fait qu'elles constituent un modèle clair, et couronne
de succès, pour le reste de la Somalie.
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